The Daily Daf

We began a new mesekhet this week – Temurah. This mesekhet continues the theme of smaller topics in kodshim, sacrifices and sanctified items, and nicely completes the previous mesekhet Arakhin, in that it wraps up the mitzvot that appear at the end of parshat Bechukotai.

What is different about this mesekhet overall is its textual peculiarities. Even after less than a week of the daf, people will notice how many textual variants/corrections there are. This is an indication of a tractate that was not studied extensively, hence no consensus developed regarding a standard text, and errors were more likely to creep in.

Beyond the textual variants, however, another distinctive feature exists, and that is the frequency of לישנא אחרינא, of the Gemara presenting another version, which for all intents and purposes is the exact same as the previous one in terms of content, but uses slightly different terminology or phrasing. The extensive presence of such לישנא אחרינא indicates that there were two parallel texts on the sugya, and some editor, at some time, rather than selecting one over the other, put both of them in and indicated that they were competing options with the phrase לישנא אחרנא.

Where did these alternatives texts come from? It is possible to speculate that they developed at the same time in the same location and the existence of both versions again – like in the case of textual variants – was an outgrowth of the fact that this tractate was not extensively studied. However, it is hard to imagine that this led to such significantly different alternative texts. More significantly, this ignores another fact, namely, that these לישנא אחרינא texts have a different grammar and style than the classic Bavli texts do. This indicates a different provenance for these alternative versions.

Rashi on today’s daf (6b, s.v., biShinuy koneh) notes as such:

ל”א … ובין האי לישנא ללישנא ד[שנייה] לי[ה] בשינוי קונה ליכא מידי אלא זה ירושלמי וזה בבלי.

Lishna Achrina … There is no difference between this version and the version where the Gemara answers “שינוי קונה”, except that this one is a Yerushalmi version, and the other one [the first one] is a Bavli version.

So according to Rashi, these are versions of the sugya from Eretz Yisrael, or perhaps even from the Yerushalmi itself. Now, although Rambam in his Commentary to the Mishna states that there is a Yerushalmi on Kodshim, we have no extant texts of this, and it is questionable if it ever existed. In fact, there was quite a scandal about 100 years ago when someone claimed to have “found” the Yerushalmi Kodshim. Needless to say, it was a forgery. A short write-up of this can be found here. So, it isn’t from the Yerushalmi, but perhaps it is nevertheless from Eretz Yisrael. And, in fact, scholars have noted that some of the linguistic peculiarities of these לישנא אחרינא versions have parallels to the Aramaic of the Land of Israel. This approach, then, represents one school of scholars – that these texts originate in Eretz Yisrael.

Two other schools of thought exist. One – the most widely accepted one – is that both these texts are from Bavel, but the לישנא אחרינא ones are from Pumbeditha and Neharda, where the Aramaic was more similar to that of Eretz Yisrael. The rest of the Bavli – and the base text of Temurah – was edited in Sura by Rav Ashi. Our mesekhet, then, represents two parallel versions of some sugyot – one from Sura and one from Pumbeditha and Neharada.

A third group of scholars believe that the difference is not geographical, but chronological. According to Avraham Weiss, the לישנא אחרינא versions actually represent earlier versions of the sugya, whereas Epstein believes that they are later. A consensus regarding this has not been reached.

Now, these questions relate not just to Temurah and the lishna achrina versions, but actually to 5 entire mesekhtot: Nedarim, Nazir, Meilah, Keritot, Tamid. All these mesekhtot reflect the linguistic peculiarities of our לישנא אחרינא versions, so the questions of redaction and provenance apply equally to these mesekhtot, two of which we will be learning soon in the daf.

These issues are nicely spelled out in Strack and Stemberger’s Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash - required reading on issues of contemporary Talmud scholarship – in their chapter on the Babylonian Talmud. On our Resources page, we have posted the entire chapter as well as the selection that focuses on these distinctive tractates and the לישנא אחרינא of our mesekhet. As we will be encountering these textual issues for the next three months, this short selection is well worth the reading!

Posted in Daf Yomi, General Interest, Resources, Temurah | Tagged redaction, textual variants | 2 Comments

Arakhin 3 – Women & Megillah, Women & Zimmun, Minors & Zimmun

Posted on January 16, 2012 by Rabbi Dov Linzer

Today’s daf continued the topic of mishnayot and braittot that use the word “הכל”, “all [are obligated/kosher/etc.]” and explored who is included in that phrase. The first 3 cases in the Gemara are highly relevant today: (1) All are obligated in megillah and can read megillah for others; (2) All are obligated in zimmun; and (3) All combine for zimmun. Let’s look at those three cases:

(1) Megillah. The Gemara states that the phrase “all” is meant to include women, with the implicit conclusion that women have the same obligation in megillah as men, and can read for men. Rashi, Rambam, and many rishonim rule accordingly. Tosafot, however, quotes Hilkhot Gedolot who quotes a Tosefta that states that women are exempt. Rather than rejecting the Tosefta, it is reconciled with our Gemara to mean that women are exempt from reading the megilah, but are obligated to hear it. Thus, our Gemara which says they are obligated and can read, only means that they are obligated to hear, and can only read for other women with a similar level of obligation. This leads some Rishonim to even suggest an alterante brakha for women – לשמוע מגילה. Shulkhan Arukh (OH 689:1-2) rules that women are obligated the same as men, but he does note the dissenting opinion. Rema rules like Tosafot, that woman cannot discharge men’s obligation, and even quotes the opinion that they must make a different brakha. This topic has been discussed extensively in the last few years, and some of the major articles on this are available on our Resources page.

(2) Zimmun. Our Gemara states that women are obligated in zimmun, but also states that women (and slaves) make a zimmun separate from men. Regarding the question of obligation, Tosafot quotes a Gemara in Berakhot from which in infers that women are not fully obligated, and, based on that, interprets our Gemara to say that women can make a zimmun, but are not obligated to do so. This is how Shulkhan Arukh rules (199:7), although the Vilna Gaon, quoted by the Beiur Halakha, rules like the Rishonim who say that three women are obligated to make a zimmun.

Regarding making a zimmun separate from men – Rashi in our Gemara states that this is because the text of their birkhat ha’mazon is different from men, as – according to Rashi – they would not say “על בריתך שחתמת בבשרנו” which refers to the brit milah. In contrast, the Shita Mikuvetzet quotes the Gemara in Berakhot that the reason women and men don’t make a zimmun together is because of פריצותא, licentiousness. The text of our Gemara does not say this, but a number of Rishonim do (Meiri, Ran, Ritvah, Ra’ah). Other Rishonim (Talmidei Rabbeinu Yonah in the name of Rashi) say the reason is because אין חבורתן נאה, “[men] being in a group with them is not appropriate,” which seems like a softer form of פריצותא. Shulkhan Arukh (OH 199:6) rules that women do not make a zimmun with men without giving a reason. Mishne Brurah there quotes the reason of אין חבורתן נאה and applies this even to family members.

Recently, an article appeared in Israel by Yonatan Gershon, a student at the Gush, arguing that based on the reasons of פריצותא and אין חבורתן נאה, that nowadays, minimally, men and women from the same family should combine for a zimmun. Rav Meidan wrote a response to the article, agreeing with its halakhic conclusions, but arguing against applying it in practice because of “slippery slope” concerns. These articles, together with others, are available on our Resources page.

(3) Minors and zimmun. Our Gemara states that a minor can be part of a zimmun, if he knows the import of what he is saying. A number of Rishonim limit this to only minors near bar mitzvah and/or only to counting towards 10, not the base 3. More radically, Tosafot in our sugya quotes the Yerushalmi which states that only adults can count towards the zimmun and rules in favor of the Yerushalmi against the Bavli. The Beit Yosef (OH 199) is astounded how Tosafot can reject the Bavli in favor of the Yerushalmi. It should be noted that this is not unheard of for Tosafot, inasmuch as Ashkenazic society in the time of the Rishonim was a continuation of and influenced by Eretz Yisrael culture, and sometimes followed its practices against those of the Bavli.

Shulkhan Arukh (199:10) rules like the simple understanding of our Gemara that a minor of 6 or 7 years who understands the import of what he is saying can count towards a zimmun of 3 or 10. Rema rules like Tosafot, completely rejecting our Gemara, and states that a minor cannot count under any circumstances.

It should be noted that in Beit Yosef’s analysis of this issue, he points out that the requirement for 10 for zimmun for saying God’s name is not based on devarim she’bikdusha, and hence some Rishonim say it is easier to count a minor for this than for the base zimmun.

Posted in Arakhin, Conceptual, General Interest, Halacha, Resources | Tagged megillah, minors, women, zimmun | Leave a comment

Arakhin – Introduction: Acts of Hafla’ah

Posted on January 15, 2012 by Rabbi Dov Linzer

It’s been a while since I have posted on the blog – my apologies to all my followers. I hope to be posting more regularly on topics of interest as they arise in the daf.

Today we began a new mesekhet, one that moves us away from sacrifices and the animal world and into the area of vows and Temple dedications. The act of creating a religious status, prohibition, or obligation through a speech act is known as hafla’ah, literally “to enunciate,” based on the verse איש כי יפליא לנדור נדר נזיר, “If a person is mafli, enunciates, to vow a nazzarite vow…” (Bamidbar 6:2). The various acts that fall into this category are in dealt with in different places in the Bavli – vows and nazir appear in seder Nashim, oaths appear in seder Nezikim, and Temple donations appear here, in seder Kodashim. Rambam brings all of these together in his Book of Hafla’ah, one of the 14 books of his Yad HaChazakah. There he includes vows, oaths, nazir, and our topic – arakhin and other vowed Temple donations. It should also be noted that the separation of terumot and ma’asrot are considered to be acts of hafla’ah since they can be done by speech alone, without any physical act involved.

There are a number of halakhot unique to hafla’ah, and it is worth keeping some of them in mind as we begin this mesekhet:

Age. Normally, the act of a minor is not halakhically binding. However, in cases of hafla’ah, even a boy or girl in the year prior to their bar/bat mitzvah can make a binding vow, nezirut, etc., if they understand the import of their actions. This is mentioned in the first line of our Gemara.

It is possible that this exception is connected to the fact that hafla’ah focuses on a person’s interior state of mind – that is, it is not all about the external, objective act but also about the internal, subjective reality (see below). Thus, while formal, objective criteria for adulthood are defined only by the objectively measurable age, when it comes to hafla’ah we can also consider more subjective factors.

Intent and state of mind. Although we have called this a speech act, there is a particular focus on what one was thinking when s/he uttered this vow, oath, etc. This is phrased in the Mishna as פיו לובו שוין, “one’s mouth and heart are the same” (in sync, we might say)” (Trumot 3:8). Thus, although the general rule is that all that matters in halakha is what one said, and that what one was thinking at the time is not relevant – דברים שבלב אינם דברים, here the halakha is the opposite. We are very concerned with what a person was thinking and – if he said something other than he intended,the statement is not binding (see, e.g., Shavuot 26b and Mishna Nazir 5:1). Similarly, we can use his state of mind to help define what it was that he said (see, e.g., Nedarim 27b ,and Rosh, Shavuot 3:14).

The upshot of all of this, is that we might be talking about less of a speech act than a thought act, but a thought which needs to be articulated. This, then, leads to the next point…

Thought without speech. Can thought work by itself? The sources are not clear. On the one hand, the Gemara in Nazir 2b, states that although it is obvious what a person is thinking, he does not make himself a nazir until he enunciates it. As Tosafot there explains: דגבי נזיר כתיב כי יפליא שיפרש בפיו – “For in the case of a nazir, it says ‘when one enunciates, yafli,’ i.e., that he actually states it verbally.” In what seems to be a statement of a general principle, we find in Shavuot 26b that Shmuel says regarding an oath, גמר בלבו צריך שיוציא בפשתיו, “[even] if a person is complete intending in his heart, he must state the matter explicitly (for it to be binding).”

However, in that very discussion, the Gemara quotes two braittot – one dealing with oaths, the other dealing with Temple donations and sacrifices – which state that גמר בלבו, full intent, suffices. The Gemara dismisses the first braitta by reinterpreting it. Regarding the second braitta and the case of Temple donations and the like, the Gemara admits that this category is an exception, and does not even need a speech act. The question is what is included in this exception. Rashi states that it includes sacrifices and Temple donations. Tosafot takes it further to include even the separating of terumah (this connects with the position of Abba Elezar ben Gomel which we saw in Bekhorot 58b, that terumah can be separate במחשבה, by thought alone (see Tosafot there, 59a, ד”ה במחשבה, who discusses if even Abba Elezar would require a speech act). This is all further complicated by the Gemara in Chagiga 10a, which suggests that there are those who disagree with Shmuel and would suffice with a thought act, without speech, even as a general rule.

Certainly as far as our immediate interests are concerned, it is worth noting that for ערכין it seems that even speech is not required, and that גמר דעת could suffice.

Annulling the act. Acts of הפלאה can be annulled through the process of התרת נדרים, which is understood to apply not just to נדר but to all acts of הפלאה. Thus, a person can go to a sage, explain why, had he anticipated later events he never would have made his vow, oaths, ערך, sanctification, etc., and the sage can annul it. The Mishna in Chagiga 10a states that the entire institution of התרת נדרים is פורחין באויר ואין להם על מה שיסמוכו, hovering in the air, with nothing to support themselves on , i.e., with no clear basis in Scripture. The Gemara, not suprisingly, attempts to show how this really can be derived from Torah verses.

Scriptural basis aside, it seems that the ability to annul such act is connected to acts of הפלאה being so much based on a person’s state of mind. Thus, although the act was performed from an objective and demonstrable perspective, if the state of mind can be brought into question, even after the fact, and even just in a theoretical sense (“Had I known…”), this is sufficient to undermine this speech/thought act.

Substitute phrases (כינוים) and elliptical statements (יד). The beginning of mesekhet Nedarim deals with how exactly the speech act must be constituted. Does a person need to use a precise formula? What if they say a vernacular, or substitute word for a technical phrase? What if they make an elliptical statement? The basic rule here is that there is some latitude and the formula is not precise. Again, this points to the relevance of state of mind and intent, and that it is not just a pure speech act.

These are all some basic principles to keep in mind as we work through our mesekhet. For now, the Gemara is content to do a survey of the phrase כל in mishnayot throughout Shas to determine what it includes. More on this, later.

Posted in Arakhin, Conceptual, Introduction | Tagged annulment, haflaah, speech, speech act, thought, vows | Leave a comment

Bekhorot 2 – Christians, Oaths, and Avoda Zara

Posted on December 4, 2011 by Rabbi Dov Linzer

As a further installment in the discussion of halakhic attitudes towards Christianity, we turn again to the statement in the Talmud (Bekhorot 2b) that a person could not enter into a partnership with a non-Jew, lest the non-Jew have to take an oath, and he would then do so in the name of his god. The taking of an oath in the name of another god is something that not only a Jew cannot do, but also cannot be the cause of having been done, even by a non-Jew. The obvious question for the Tosafists then became, how could Jews enter into partnerships with Christians. Tosafot first notes the possibility that we do not rule according to the statement in the Gemara that partnerships per se are forbidden, as there are cases in other Gemarot which accept Jewish-non-Jewish partnerships. Nevertheless, Tosafot finds himself pressed to articulate a better answer, since in his day Jews actually would not only enter into partnerships, but would actually demand and accept oaths from non-Jews, which – when done in the name of another god – is unquestionably forbidden. How, then, was this practice accepted? Here is Tosafot’s answer:

עוד פר”ת בזמן הזה כולן נשבעים בקדשים ואין תופסין בהם אלהות ואע”פ שמזכירין [עמהם] שם שמים וכוונתם [לד"א מ"מ] אין זה [שם] עבודת כוכבים כי דעתם לשם עושה שמים וארץ ואע”ג שמשתתף ש”ש ודבר אחר אין כאן לפני עור לא תתן מכשול דבני נח לא הוזהרו על כך ולדידן לא אשכחן איסור בגרם שיתוף.

Rabbeinu Tam further explains that nowadays they (Christians) all take oaths in the name of their saints and they don’t attribute to them any divinity. And although they mention the name of God and their intention is to something else (i.e., the Christian concept of God), this is not considered the name of a foreign god because their intention is for the Creator of Heaven and Earth. And although they “join” (mishtatef) the heavenly name with another thing, there is no prohibition of “before the blind do not place a stumbling block,” because Noahides are not prohibited on this issue, and for us (Jews), we have not found that there is a prohibition to bring about such “joining.”

(Tosafot, Bekhorot 2b, s.v. Shema).

Let us a dissect this statement. First, Tosafot points out that Christian oaths which are taken in the name of a saint, are not oaths in the name of another god, as saints are not treated as gods. But these oaths are not only in the name of saints, but also in the name of God. (Remember Henry V (Act 3, scene 1): Follow your spirit, and upon this charge / Cry ‘God for Harry, England, and Saint George!’). Now, here is the interesting question – when Christians say “God”, not Jesus, is this the “name of other gods”? Tosafot says that it is not, for both (a) they use the same name that we do and (b) it refers to the same Being – the Creator of Heaven and Earth. Both the symbol (the word “God”) and the referent (the Being referred to) are the same. The exact meaning here – that the referent is not “another god” – is open to interpretation. I believe that Tosafot is saying that when Christians say “God”, rather than “Jesus”, they are referring to the Christian concept of God the Father, which is totally consistent with the Jewish concept of God.

Some may argue – although I do not believe this was the intention – that Tosafot is saying that even if they are referring to the Trinity as a whole, or to any part of it, since this concept includes the idea of God who is the Creator of Heaven and Earth, it is not considered the name of another god. This reading would seem to come very close to saying that Christianity is not avoda zara – if it is the same God, how could it be avoda zara? However, Tosafot consistently and unambiguously asserts that Christianity is avoda zara. What, then, about the above statement? There are two possible explanations. Either that Christianity is avoda zara not because their concept of God is different (which it is, but, according to this approach, not sufficiently so) but rather because their worship uses images. If this were the case, then strands of Christianity that developed after Tosafot, in particular Protestantism, which does not use images, would not be avoda zara! An alternative explanation is that while their concept of God is, indeed, “another god” (because of the belief in incarnation and the Trinity), nevertheless, taking an oath in the name “God” while referring to any part of the Trinity, is not “swearing in the name of another God” since the symbol is the same and the referent is close enough. Thus they symbol, the word “God” cannot be said to be the name of another god, although that is, in fact, what the Trinity is.

As previously stated, if Tosafot is specifically referring to the Christian concept of God the Father, then the theological implications of the statement are much narrower. Nevertheless, this first statement in significant in that – in the middle of the Tosafists halakhic world in which Christianity was defined as avoda zara - there is an assertion to the overlap of the Christian idea of God and the Jewish idea of God. However, what has not been stated is that Christianity is not considered avoda zara. For this we must turn to the last statement of Tosafot – what it means and how it has been interpreted.

Tosafot, after addressing the concern with the “name of other gods”, turns to the problem of mishtatef, of joining God with something else. What is this problem to which he refers? Here Tosafot is referring to the statement in Sanhedrin (83a) about the worship of the Golden Calf:

אחרים אומרים: אלמלא וי”ו שבהעלוך נתחייבו שונאיהם של ישראל כלייה, אמר לו רבי שמעון בן יוחאי: והלא כל המשתף שם שמים ודבר אחר נעקר מן העולם, שנאמר בלתי לה’ לבדו!

There are those who say, that were it not for the vav (which pluralizes) in ‘[these are your gods, Israel, who have brought thee up’, the people of Israel would have deserved extermination [for the worship of the Calf. But the vav indicated that they were worshiping the Calf together with God]. Thereupon R. Shimon ben Yochai remarked; But whoever combines (mishtatef) the Heavenly Name with anything else is utterly destroyed [lit., ‘eradicated from the world’], for it is written, He that sacrifices unto any god, save unto the Lord alone, he shall be utterly destroyed (Shemot 22:19).

Here the issue is worshipping another being together with God, which, according to Rebbe Shimon ben Yochai’s statement, does not stop the act from being avoda zara. However, there is another context of this statement, which is not about worship, but about verbal praise:

בשעת פטירתן מה הן אומרים וכו’. והא קא משתתף שם שמים ודבר אחר, ותניא: המשתף שם שמים ודבר אחר נעקר מן העולם, שנאמר בלתי לה’ לבדו! – הכי קאמר: ליה אנחנו מודים ולך אנו משבחין, ליה אנחנו מודים, ולך אנו מקלסין.

[When the people, on Hoshana Rabbah, departed from their procession around the altar, they would say, according to R. Eliezer, "To God and to you, oh Altar, (we praise).] But does not one thereby associate (mishtatef) the name of God with something else? And it has been taught, Whosoever associates the name of God with something else is uprooted from the world, as it is said, Save unto the Lord alone? —Rather, what they said was: To God we give thanks, and to you, the Altar, we praise”. [Thus praising them separately.]
(Sukkah 45b).

Here the concern is much broader – God cannot be joined with any other thing or being, even in an act of praise. Rambam (Laws of Oaths 11:2) thus uses this extended concept to prohibit taking an oath in the name of God combined with any other thing or being, “for there is no being to whom it is appropriate to show the respect of taking an oath in its name, save for the One, blessed be He.” The midrash, in fact, uses this application to explain a verse in this week’s parsha:

And Yaakov took an oath in the name of the Fear of his father, Yitzchak” (Breishit 30:53) – so as not to mention any part of what Lavan said (for Lavan had mentioned the name of Avraham’s God, which was holy and the name of Nachor’s god, which was profane). This was so he would not combine, lishatef, the profane with the holy.
(Psikta Rabbati, 31)

The issue, then, of Tosafot’s understanding and use of the scope of the prohibition against “joining”, mishtatef, God with other beings, is critical. Read narrowly, it seems that Tosafot is only raising the question of the local problem of taking an oath. Although – Tosafot is saying – we have demonstrated that the oath that Christians take is in the name of God and in the name of saints, neither of which are other gods, is there not a problem that a Jew is causing a Christian to take an oath by combining the name of God with the name of a saint? Isn’t this prohibited? To this, Tosafot answers, that this problem of combining, shituf, God and another being in an oath, is only a problem for Jews, not for non-Jews. And there is no prohibition for a Jew to cause a non-Jew to take such an oath. Read this way, Tosafot has only solved the problem of oaths, but has not made a statement with larger implications for the halakhic understanding of Christianity.

However, we have seen that the problem of shituf also extends to worshipping God with other beings. If this is Tosafot’s meaning, then his answer – that non-Jews are not prohibited against shituf, has profound implications for the halakhic status of Christianity. While it seems quite clear, from the context and the wording, that Tosafot’s meaning was the narrower oath context, his statement was read to refer to the broader, worship context. Next week we will continue to explore this issue, and see how this latter reading of Tosafot changed the way that halakha dealt – and deals! – with Christianity.

Posted in Bekhorot, General Interest, Halacha | Leave a comment

Bekhorot 2 – More on Saying the Name of Jesus

Posted on December 2, 2011 by Rabbi Dov Linzer

While we are now well into the second chapter of Bekhorot and will be finishing it soon, I wanted to share a few more posts related to Bekhorot 2b, and the Tosafot – saying the name of other gods, and halakhic attitudes towards Christianity.

First, regarding saying the name of Jesus. I had a fascinating exchange with the author of the On the Main Line blog. He pointed out that Shadal (R. Shmuel David Luzzatto, Italy, 19th Century) had no problem using the last name of Jesus in his writings. You can see his post, with the quote from Shadal, here.

In this case in particular, but in halakha in general, it is important to not only explore the written teshuvot but also to find out what the people were doing, and the rabbis ruling, on the ground. If something was taken-for-granted permitted, there would not be a responsum about it. I would invite my readers who know of any relevant historical or literary information in this regard to share it with me, so that we can get a fuller picture of this issue.

I repeat here my response to the above comment, and the poster’s response back to me. As you will see, I present a teshuva that reports some facts on the ground that we may never have known about otherwise.

My response:

One wonders whether this reflects a different attitude towards the prohibition – perhaps limiting it to when the names are used in a more religious context, or perhaps assuming that the last name is not actually a divine appellation – or whether, perhaps more likely, this reflects a different attitude that Italians had towards Christianity in general, or to the need to maintain strong boundaries. There is evidence for the latter, as we find in the responsa Krakh shel Romi (City of Rome), by R. Yisrael Moshe Hazan, Chief Rabbi of Rome, from the mid-19th century (the same period as Shadal), in responsum 1, where he allows the use of church-originated music in the synagogue. He even states that the cantors went to the church to hear the music so that they could adopt it for use during the Yamim Noraim (I thank Dr. Marc Shapiro for first bringing my attention to this responsum). Here is the key snippet:

ומעיד אני עלי שמים וארץ שבהיותי בעיר גדולה של חכמים ושל סופרים סמירנ”א יע”א ראיתי מגדולי החכמים המפורסמים שהיו משוררים גדולים על המשקל המוסיק”א ובראשם הר’ המופלא אברהם הכהן אריאש זלה”ה. ולמשקל המוסיק”א של ימים נוראים הצריכה הכנעה גדולה נקראת אצלם חיזון היו הולכים בכנסיות הנוצרים מאחחרי הפרגוד בימי חגם להתלמד מהם אותו הקול המוכנע המשבר את הלב. והיו מסדרים מאותם הקולות קדישים וקדשות דבר פלא. ומעשה רב כזה הוא סיוע גדול על כל האמור ומפורש לעיל ודי בזה.

And I call on Heaven and Earth as witnesses, that when I was in the large city of sages and scribes, Smyrna, [Greece,] that I saw some of the great sages who were famous for being great cantors, that they would sing with the musical structure and form [of the Church]. And chief among them was the great Rabbi, Avraham Cohen Ariash, z”l. And for the musical structure and form for the Days of Awe, which need to create a profound sense of submission, which is termed by them chizun, they would go to the churches of the Christians, standing behind the divider, during the Christian holidays, to learn from them that sound and melody which has the power to humble the heart. And they would then compose from those sounds kadishes and kedushahs, into something of wonder. And such a significant event as this is a strong support for everything that I have been arguing above.

His final comment:

My instinct is that it is indeed an Italian thing. To give another illustration from the same source, Shadal writes of a childhood incident where he strongly desired a new coat. His family had very little money, and his father basically told him no. So his mother took pity and fashioned a coat out of one of her dresses, which happened to be scarlet. He wore it proudly, but never put it on again after the kids at the Talmud Torah taunted him “Cardinal! Cardinal!”

That’s a very Italian story, is it not?

Note, however, that although R. Yisrael Moshe was indeed a rav in Italy, his proof is from Smyrna. I’m not sure what to make of that, but presumably we are indeed seeing different cultural attitudes toward Christianity. It would have been nice if they had written about the religious underpinnings of the attitude, if any, which is clearly different from what probably most Ashkenazim are used to.

Posted in Bekhorot, General Interest | Leave a comment

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